Verify control plane / verify (pull_request) Canceled after 0s
Bug 1 (high): login rate limiting used request.getRemoteAddr(), which is always the nginx container address. Every client shared one bucket, so any anonymous caller could lock the whole platform out of login for 60 seconds. - Add ClientIp to resolve the real address, honouring X-Real-IP / X-Forwarded-For only when the direct peer is a proxy we operate (loopback, private or container range). Public peers cannot spoof. - Prefer X-Real-IP, fall back to the right-most X-Forwarded-For entry so client-supplied prefixes are ignored. Guard with an IP literal check so a malformed header can never trigger a DNS lookup. - nginx now overwrites the forwarded headers with $remote_addr instead of clearing them, so spoofed values never reach the backend. - Add a global login ceiling (600/60s) well above the per-address limit. Bug 2: the landing page had no login entry point on mobile. The collapsed menu button was permanently display:none and the login link was hidden below 550px, leaving no way to reach an account. - Show the menu button below 850px, render nav as a dropdown panel. - Add a login item inside the collapsed menu. Bug 3: upload size limits disagreed across three layers. nginx capped requests at 1m while the backend and UI advertise 25MiB, so any file over 1 MiB failed with nginx's HTML error page. - Raise client_max_body_size to 26m to match the backend. - Return 413 as JSON matching the API error shape. Tests: 153 backend tests pass, including 10 new ClientIpTest cases covering spoofed headers, right-most entry selection, IPv4-mapped IPv6, and malformed values.
39 lines
1.7 KiB
Nginx Configuration File
39 lines
1.7 KiB
Nginx Configuration File
server {
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listen 8080;
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server_name _;
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root /usr/share/nginx/html;
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index index.html;
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server_tokens off;
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client_max_body_size 26m;
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add_header X-Content-Type-Options nosniff always;
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add_header Referrer-Policy strict-origin-when-cross-origin always;
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add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; img-src 'self' data: https:; connect-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'" always;
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# Oversized uploads are answered in the same JSON shape as the API instead of nginx's HTML page.
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error_page 413 = @upload_too_large;
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location @upload_too_large {
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default_type application/json;
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return 413 '{"message":"单文件不能超过 25MiB"}';
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}
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location /api/public/extensions/plugin-frame/ {
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# This response carries the backend's sandbox policy. The app shell remains non-frameable.
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add_header X-Content-Type-Options nosniff always;
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proxy_pass http://backend:8080;
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proxy_http_version 1.1;
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proxy_set_header Host $host;
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# Overwrite rather than append: a client-supplied value must never reach the backend. The
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# backend only reads these when the direct peer is a trusted proxy.
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr;
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proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
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}
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location /api/ {
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proxy_pass http://backend:8080;
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proxy_http_version 1.1;
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proxy_set_header Host $host;
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# Overwrite rather than append: a client-supplied value must never reach the backend. The
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# backend only trusts these when the direct peer is a private/loopback proxy address.
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr;
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proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
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}
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location / { try_files $uri $uri/ /index.html; }
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}
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