Files
Morris 347e723583
Verify control plane / verify (pull_request) Canceled after 0s
fix: resolve client IP behind proxy and align upload limits
Bug 1 (high): login rate limiting used request.getRemoteAddr(), which is
always the nginx container address. Every client shared one bucket, so any
anonymous caller could lock the whole platform out of login for 60 seconds.

- Add ClientIp to resolve the real address, honouring X-Real-IP /
  X-Forwarded-For only when the direct peer is a proxy we operate
  (loopback, private or container range). Public peers cannot spoof.
- Prefer X-Real-IP, fall back to the right-most X-Forwarded-For entry so
  client-supplied prefixes are ignored. Guard with an IP literal check so
  a malformed header can never trigger a DNS lookup.
- nginx now overwrites the forwarded headers with $remote_addr instead of
  clearing them, so spoofed values never reach the backend.
- Add a global login ceiling (600/60s) well above the per-address limit.

Bug 2: the landing page had no login entry point on mobile. The collapsed
menu button was permanently display:none and the login link was hidden
below 550px, leaving no way to reach an account.

- Show the menu button below 850px, render nav as a dropdown panel.
- Add a login item inside the collapsed menu.

Bug 3: upload size limits disagreed across three layers. nginx capped
requests at 1m while the backend and UI advertise 25MiB, so any file over
1 MiB failed with nginx's HTML error page.

- Raise client_max_body_size to 26m to match the backend.
- Return 413 as JSON matching the API error shape.

Tests: 153 backend tests pass, including 10 new ClientIpTest cases
covering spoofed headers, right-most entry selection, IPv4-mapped IPv6,
and malformed values.
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