fix: resolve client IP behind proxy and align upload limits
Verify control plane / verify (pull_request) Canceled after 0s
Verify control plane / verify (pull_request) Canceled after 0s
Bug 1 (high): login rate limiting used request.getRemoteAddr(), which is always the nginx container address. Every client shared one bucket, so any anonymous caller could lock the whole platform out of login for 60 seconds. - Add ClientIp to resolve the real address, honouring X-Real-IP / X-Forwarded-For only when the direct peer is a proxy we operate (loopback, private or container range). Public peers cannot spoof. - Prefer X-Real-IP, fall back to the right-most X-Forwarded-For entry so client-supplied prefixes are ignored. Guard with an IP literal check so a malformed header can never trigger a DNS lookup. - nginx now overwrites the forwarded headers with $remote_addr instead of clearing them, so spoofed values never reach the backend. - Add a global login ceiling (600/60s) well above the per-address limit. Bug 2: the landing page had no login entry point on mobile. The collapsed menu button was permanently display:none and the login link was hidden below 550px, leaving no way to reach an account. - Show the menu button below 850px, render nav as a dropdown panel. - Add a login item inside the collapsed menu. Bug 3: upload size limits disagreed across three layers. nginx capped requests at 1m while the backend and UI advertise 25MiB, so any file over 1 MiB failed with nginx's HTML error page. - Raise client_max_body_size to 26m to match the backend. - Return 413 as JSON matching the API error shape. Tests: 153 backend tests pass, including 10 new ClientIpTest cases covering spoofed headers, right-most entry selection, IPv4-mapped IPv6, and malformed values.
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@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ public class AuthController {
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@NotBlank @Size(max = 10) String captchaCode) {}
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public static String ip(HttpServletRequest req) {
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return req.getRemoteAddr();
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return ClientIp.of(req);
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}
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public static String ua(HttpServletRequest req) {
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@@ -52,8 +52,13 @@ public class AuthController {
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}
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private void check(String email, String id, String code, HttpServletRequest r) {
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store.limit("auth-ip:" + ip(r), 20, 60);
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String address = ip(r);
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// Per-address bucket: a single client cannot exhaust the shared allowance for everyone.
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store.limit("auth-ip:" + address, 20, 60);
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store.limit("auth-email:" + SecurityConfig.hash(email.toLowerCase(Locale.ROOT)), 10, 300);
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// Global ceiling across all addresses, raised well above the per-address limit so ordinary
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// traffic is never affected while total login throughput stays bounded.
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store.limit("auth-global", 600, 60);
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captcha.verify(id, code);
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
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package run.webup.platform;
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import jakarta.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
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import java.net.InetAddress;
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import java.util.List;
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/**
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* Resolves the real client address behind the bundled reverse proxy.
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*
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* <p>The control plane is normally reached through the frontend nginx container. Because that proxy
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* overwrites the forwarded headers, {@code request.getRemoteAddr()} is always the proxy address;
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* using it directly would collapse every user into one rate-limit bucket and let a single caller
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* lock out the whole platform.
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*
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* <p>Forwarded headers are only honoured when the direct peer is a proxy we operate (loopback or a
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* private/container address). A public peer therefore cannot spoof its address by sending the
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* header itself.
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*/
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public final class ClientIp {
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private static final String FORWARDED_FOR = "X-Forwarded-For";
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private static final String REAL_IP = "X-Real-IP";
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private ClientIp() {}
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/** Returns the client address used for rate limiting and audit records. */
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public static String of(HttpServletRequest request) {
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String peer = normalize(request.getRemoteAddr());
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if (!trustedProxy(peer)) return peer;
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// X-Real-IP is written by our own nginx from $remote_addr, so it cannot be spoofed by a client.
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String real = normalize(request.getHeader(REAL_IP));
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if (ipLiteral(real)) return real;
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// Otherwise take the right-most X-Forwarded-For entry: that is the value our proxy appended.
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// Anything further left came from the client and is not trustworthy.
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String forwarded = lastValidForwardedFor(request.getHeader(FORWARDED_FOR));
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return forwarded == null ? peer : forwarded;
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}
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private static String lastValidForwardedFor(String header) {
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if (header == null || header.isBlank()) return null;
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List<String> parts = List.of(header.split(","));
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for (int i = parts.size() - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
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String candidate = normalize(parts.get(i));
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if (ipLiteral(candidate)) return candidate;
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}
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return null;
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}
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/** Trims whitespace, strips IPv6 brackets and unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses. */
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static String normalize(String value) {
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if (value == null) return "";
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String address = value.trim();
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if (address.isEmpty()) return "";
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if (address.startsWith("[")) {
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int end = address.indexOf(']');
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if (end > 0) address = address.substring(1, end);
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}
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if (address.regionMatches(true, 0, "::ffff:", 0, 7)) address = address.substring(7);
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return address.length() > 64 ? address.substring(0, 64) : address;
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}
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/**
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* True for both IPv4 and IPv6 literals. Guards {@link InetAddress#getByName} so a malformed
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* header value can never trigger a DNS lookup.
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*/
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static boolean ipLiteral(String value) {
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if (value == null || value.isEmpty()) return false;
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boolean digitsAndDots = true;
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for (int i = 0; i < value.length(); i++) {
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char c = value.charAt(i);
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if (!Character.isDigit(c) && c != '.') {
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digitsAndDots = false;
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break;
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}
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}
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if (digitsAndDots) return value.indexOf('.') > 0;
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// Conservative IPv6 check: hex digits, colons and at most one embedded IPv4 tail.
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for (int i = 0; i < value.length(); i++) {
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char c = value.charAt(i);
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boolean ok =
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Character.digit(c, 16) >= 0 || c == ':' || c == '.' || c == '%' || c == ']' || c == '[';
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if (!ok) return false;
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}
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return value.indexOf(':') >= 0;
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}
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/** True when the direct peer is a reverse proxy we operate rather than an arbitrary client. */
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static boolean trustedProxy(String peer) {
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if (!ipLiteral(peer)) return false;
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try {
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InetAddress address = InetAddress.getByName(peer);
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return address.isLoopbackAddress()
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|| address.isAnyLocalAddress()
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|| address.isSiteLocalAddress()
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|| sharedAddressSpace(peer);
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} catch (Exception e) {
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return false;
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}
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}
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/** RFC 6598 shared address space, used by container and overlay networks. */
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private static boolean sharedAddressSpace(String peer) {
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if (!peer.startsWith("100.")) return false;
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String[] parts = peer.split("\\.");
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if (parts.length != 4) return false;
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try {
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int second = Integer.parseInt(parts[1]);
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return second >= 64 && second <= 127;
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} catch (NumberFormatException e) {
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return false;
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}
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}
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
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package run.webup.platform;
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import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
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import static org.mockito.Mockito.*;
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import jakarta.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
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import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
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class ClientIpTest {
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private static HttpServletRequest request(String remoteAddr, String forwardedFor, String realIp) {
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HttpServletRequest request = mock(HttpServletRequest.class);
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when(request.getRemoteAddr()).thenReturn(remoteAddr);
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when(request.getHeader("X-Forwarded-For")).thenReturn(forwardedFor);
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when(request.getHeader("X-Real-IP")).thenReturn(realIp);
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return request;
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}
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@Test
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void directPublicClientIsNeverRewrittenByHeaders() {
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// A public peer must not be able to spoof its address.
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assertEquals(
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"203.0.113.9",
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ClientIp.of(request("203.0.113.9", "1.2.3.4", "5.6.7.8")));
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}
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@Test
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void trustedProxyResolvesRealClientFromRealIp() {
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assertEquals(
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"203.0.113.9",
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ClientIp.of(request("172.19.0.5", null, "203.0.113.9")));
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}
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@Test
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void trustedProxyFallsBackToForwardedFor() {
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assertEquals(
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"203.0.113.9",
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ClientIp.of(request("172.19.0.5", "203.0.113.9", null)));
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}
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@Test
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void usesRightMostForwardedEntrySoClientCannotSpoofPrefix() {
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// The client sent "1.2.3.4"; our proxy appended the real address on the right.
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assertEquals(
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"203.0.113.9",
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ClientIp.of(request("172.19.0.5", "1.2.3.4, 203.0.113.9", null)));
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}
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@Test
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void separateClientsGetSeparateBuckets() {
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// Regression: behind the proxy these used to both resolve to 172.19.0.5.
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String first = ClientIp.of(request("172.19.0.5", null, "198.51.100.7"));
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String second = ClientIp.of(request("172.19.0.5", null, "198.51.100.8"));
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assertNotEquals(first, second);
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}
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@Test
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void loopbackProxyIsTrusted() {
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assertEquals("203.0.113.9", ClientIp.of(request("127.0.0.1", null, "203.0.113.9")));
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assertEquals("203.0.113.9", ClientIp.of(request("::1", null, "203.0.113.9")));
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}
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@Test
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void ipv4MappedIpv6IsUnwrapped() {
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assertEquals(
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"203.0.113.9",
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ClientIp.of(request("::ffff:172.19.0.5", null, "::ffff:203.0.113.9")));
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}
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@Test
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void bracketedIpv6IsUnwrapped() {
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assertEquals("2001:db8::1", ClientIp.normalize("[2001:db8::1]"));
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}
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@Test
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void malformedForwardedValueFallsBackToPeerInsteadOfResolvingDns() {
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assertEquals(
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"172.19.0.5",
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ClientIp.of(request("172.19.0.5", "not-an-ip", "also-not-an-ip")));
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}
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@Test
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void blankAndNullInputsAreSafe() {
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assertEquals("", ClientIp.normalize(null));
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assertEquals("", ClientIp.normalize(" "));
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assertFalse(ClientIp.ipLiteral(""));
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assertFalse(ClientIp.trustedProxy(""));
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assertEquals("172.19.0.5", ClientIp.of(request("172.19.0.5", " ", " ")));
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}
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}
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+15
-6
@@ -4,26 +4,35 @@ server {
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root /usr/share/nginx/html;
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index index.html;
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server_tokens off;
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client_max_body_size 1m;
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client_max_body_size 26m;
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add_header X-Content-Type-Options nosniff always;
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add_header Referrer-Policy strict-origin-when-cross-origin always;
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add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; img-src 'self' data: https:; connect-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'" always;
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# Oversized uploads are answered in the same JSON shape as the API instead of nginx's HTML page.
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error_page 413 = @upload_too_large;
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location @upload_too_large {
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default_type application/json;
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return 413 '{"message":"单文件不能超过 25MiB"}';
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}
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location /api/public/extensions/plugin-frame/ {
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# This response carries the backend's sandbox policy. The app shell remains non-frameable.
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add_header X-Content-Type-Options nosniff always;
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proxy_pass http://backend:8080;
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proxy_http_version 1.1;
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proxy_set_header Host $host;
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For "";
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proxy_set_header X-Real-IP "";
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# Overwrite rather than append: a client-supplied value must never reach the backend. The
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# backend only reads these when the direct peer is a trusted proxy.
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr;
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proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
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}
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location /api/ {
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proxy_pass http://backend:8080;
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proxy_http_version 1.1;
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proxy_set_header Host $host;
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# Backend intentionally does not trust user-supplied forwarded IP headers.
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For "";
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proxy_set_header X-Real-IP "";
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# Overwrite rather than append: a client-supplied value must never reach the backend. The
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# backend only trusts these when the direct peer is a private/loopback proxy address.
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr;
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proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
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}
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location / { try_files $uri $uri/ /index.html; }
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}
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@@ -913,6 +913,10 @@
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.landing-menu {
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display: none;
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}
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/* Only rendered inside the collapsed mobile menu; desktop keeps the standalone 登录 link. */
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.landing-nav-login {
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display: none;
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}
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.mobile-break {
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display: none;
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}
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@@ -996,8 +1000,50 @@
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}
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}
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@media (max-width: 850px) {
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.landing-nav {
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position: relative;
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gap: 10px;
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}
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.landing-menu {
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display: inline-flex;
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margin-left: auto;
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}
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.landing-nav nav {
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position: absolute;
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top: calc(100% + 1px);
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left: 16px;
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right: 16px;
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display: none;
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flex-direction: column;
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gap: 2px;
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padding: 8px;
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background: var(--landing-surface, #fff);
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border: 1px solid var(--landing-border, #eef1f6);
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border-radius: 12px;
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box-shadow: 0 18px 40px #1d2d4814;
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z-index: 40;
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}
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.landing-nav nav.expanded {
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display: flex;
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}
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.landing-nav nav > a {
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padding: 12px 14px;
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border-radius: 8px;
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font-size: 13px;
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}
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.landing-nav nav > a:hover {
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background: var(--landing-accentSoft, #edf3ff);
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}
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.landing-nav nav .landing-nav-login {
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display: block;
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padding: 12px 14px;
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border-radius: 8px;
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font-size: 13px;
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color: var(--landing-muted, #7a879b);
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}
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.landing-nav nav .landing-nav-login:hover {
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background: var(--landing-accentSoft, #edf3ff);
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color: var(--landing-accent, #3868f5);
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}
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.landing-hero {
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grid-template-columns: 1fr;
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@@ -105,7 +105,13 @@ onMounted(async () => {
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<a href="#features" @click="menu = false">平台能力</a
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><a href="#workflow" @click="menu = false">开发流程</a
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><a href="#plans" @click="menu = false">托管套餐</a
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><a href="#questions" @click="menu = false">常见问题</a>
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><a href="#questions" @click="menu = false">常见问题</a
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><RouterLink
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class="landing-nav-login"
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to="/login"
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@click="menu = false"
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>登录</RouterLink
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>
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</nav>
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<div class="landing-nav-actions">
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<RouterLink class="landing-login" to="/login">登录</RouterLink
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